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COMMENTS
Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First
Amendment Analysis
Richard A. Posner
In The FirstAmendment's Purpose,' Jed Rubenfeld sets against the "costbenefit balancing" approach to free speech issues,2 with me as spokesman,3 an
approach that forswears balancing in favor of inquiry into legislative or
regulatory purpose ("purposivism"). From certain "paradigm cases" 4-by
which he means constitutional interpretations today uniformly accepted as
valid-he infers three things: The First Amendment 5 forbids all regulation
intended to limit the expression of opinion ("no one can be punished for
expressing himself on a matter of opinion" 6), regardless of consequences. It
forbids no regulation of expression, again regardless of consequences, that is
not so intended. And it allows all falsefactual assertions to be punished.
The contrast between Rubenfeld's approach and the pragmatic approach to
free speech and other legal issues, an approach that I have defended, 7 is stark,
and provides the stimulus for this paper. I shall assume in what follows that the
reader has read his article.
* Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of

Chicago Law School. I thank Michael Boudin, Frank Easterbrook, Lawrence Lessig, David
Strauss, Cass Sunstein, and Adrian Vermeule for their very helpful comments on a previous
draft.
1. Jed Rubenfeld, The FirstAmendment's Purpose,53 STAN. L. REv. 767 (2001).
2. Id. at 785; see also id. at 767-68, 781, 791. He equates balancing with cost-benefit
analysis; I discuss this equation in the text below.
3. See, e.g., id. at 779-82, 832. See Richard A. Posner, The Speech Market, in
RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 62 (2001) for the fullest statement of my

position. That piece was, however, published after Rubenfeld's article.
4. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 821-22.
5. By this I mean to include the First Amendment's application to state action in the
name of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
6. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 770.
7. See, for example, POSNER, supra note 3, and the following books of mine: THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990), OVERCOMING LAW (1995), THE PROBLEMATICS OF
MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999), and, most recently, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE
2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS, 168-75, 185-89 (2001).
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I must explain at the outset what I mean by "pragmatism," "pragmatic
adjudication," and "the pragmatic approach to free speech." Pragmatism is a
complex philosophical movement 8 the core of which is a challenge to the
preoccupation of the central philosophical tradition of the West, from Plato to
Kant and Russell and Camap, with establishing the foundations of
knowledge-the conditions under which scientific, moral, and political beliefs
can be said to be true. Pragmatists believe that the task of establishing such
foundations and so validating our beliefs as objective is either impossible or
uninteresting, and in either case not worth doing. The test for knowledge
should not be whether it puts us in touch with an ultimate reality (whether
scientific, aesthetic, moral, or political) but whether it is useful in helping us to
achieve our ends. The human mind developed not to build a pipeline to the
truth but to cope with the physical environment in which human beings
evolved, and so be tested not by its correspondence with "reality" but by the
consequences of believing or disbelieving it.
Pragmatism doesn't lead in a straight line to a philosophy of adjudication.
But it encourages a mindset that is skeptical of any such philosophy that casts
the judge in the role of a quester after certainty who employs to that end tools
as close to formal logic as possible. It encourages the thought that the object of
adjudication should be to help society to cope with its problems, and so the
rules that judges create as a by-product of adjudication should be appraised by
a "what works" criterion rather than by the correspondence of those rules to
truth, natural law, or some other high-level abstract validating principle.
This approach is easily derided as unprincipled, ad hoc, and "political"; but
it is these things only if it is thought to entail the disregard of the systemic as
well as immediate consequences of judicial decisions, which no pragmatist
judge worth his salt believes. Indeed, a pragmatist would choose to be a
formalist judge if he thought formalism in adjudication would produce on the
whole better social consequences than attempting to weigh up the likely
consequences of each decision. I happen not to think formalism is a workable
judicial philosophy, however, and though it would take me too far afield to
argue that here, 9 I shall, in criticizing Rubenfeld's approach, be urging the
unworkability of a formalist approach to free speech, even one defended on
pragmatic grounds.
The pragmatist who has decided to be not a formalist judge (at least in free

8. Pragmatism is well described in Richard Rorty, Pragmatism, in 7 ROuTLEDGE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSoPHY 633 (Edward Craig ed., 1998). There is also an everyday
sense of "pragmatic"--very close to "hard nosed." To be pragmatic in the everyday sense is
not to worry overmuch about moral scruples; it is to be "businesslike," "no nonsense,"
"practical." There is some affinity between the everyday usage and the philosophy, but I
will not try to explore it here.
9. It is argued at length in-is in fact the main theme of-my book THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7.
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speech cases l ° ) but a pragmatic one reads the relevant language of the First
Amendment ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press") but finds nothing very helpful there so far as deciding
the actual cases that arise nowadays is concerned. (That is an important
qualification, to which I'll return: There is a core of settled meaning to the
First Amendment; but settled principles are rarely litigated.) The key term,
"freedom of speech, or of the press," is neither defined nor self-explanatory.
So the pragmatist goes foraging in the historical background of this part of the
Constitution but again finds nothing that will resolve the modem cases. He
then examines the rich case law interpreting the speech and press clauses and
finds that it owes little to the language or background of the relevant clauses, or
to the various theories that political and legal theorists have advanced
concerning the proper scope of freedom of expression.
Instead the
constitutional law of free speech seems on the whole, though certainly not in
every respect, to be a product of the judges' (mainly they are United States
Supreme Court Justices) trying to reach results that are reasonable in light of
their consequences.
I am not trying to prove that pragmatism is the theory of the First
Amendment but merely to suggest that a pragmatic approach is not foreclosed
by the language or background of the amendment or the case law applying it.
This is important because some of the systemic consequences to which a good
pragmatist judge will attend are the uncertainty about legal obligation and the
cynicism about the judicial process that are bound to arise if judges make no
effort to maintain continuity with established understandings of the law and to
observe the correlative limits on judicial creativity. The point is not that the
judge has some kind of moral or even political duty to abide by constitutional
or statutory text, or by precedent; that would be formalism. It is merely that
continuity and restraint in the performance of the judicial function are
important social goods, and any judge proposing to innovate must consider not
only the benefits of the innovation but also the costs in injury to those goods.
Another systemic consequence of judicial decisions cuts the other way but
is no less worthy of consideration. Judges have to worry that if they buck
public opinion too strongly, the political (or, rather, more political) branches of
government will clip the judicial wings. Prudence, mistaken for cowardice or
lack of principle, is likely to rein in the most aggressive assertions of judicial
power. (And so judges are most aggressive when they are dissenting, because
they don't have to live with the consequences of the positions they're
asserting-there are no consequences.) The pragmatist judge will not fool
himself into thinking that the sheer power of legal logic will carry the country
with him on matters on which it feels strongly. He will be cautious in spending
down his political capital.
10. Holmes, whose overall stance, and specifically his stance in free speech cases, was
pragmatic, was nevertheless rather a formalist when it came to contract cases.
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Concern with consequences both systemic and immediate implies a
comparison of good and bad consequences, and therefore a "balancing" of
them; and if good consequences are relabeled "benefits" and bad ones "costs,"
then pragmatic adjudication is a form of cost-benefit analysis, and Rubenfeld
has labeled me correctly after all. This is a natural though not inevitable
endpoint of a judicial philosophy that takes its cues from pragmatism. But a
number of qualifications are necessary in order to prevent misunderstanding:
(1) "Costs" and "benefits" must not be understood in exclusively or even
(in the First Amendment setting) primarily monetary terms. Indeed, because
the image of balancing costs and benefits exaggerates the precision that is
attainable in the First Amendment area, and tends to suppress the other
qualifications that I have indicated, I prefer to call the approach that I espouse
to free speech issues the "pragmatic" approach rather than the "balancing" or
"cost benefit" approach.
(2) A related point: Quantification is rarely feasible and even more rarely
undertaken when courts consider the consequences of free speech and of its
regulation.
(3) Long-run rather than short-run costs and benefits are the proper focusa point I'll come back to.
(4) Costs and benefits need not be balanced anew in every case if the costbenefit analysis of a class of cases has crystallized in a rule that the judges have
merely to apply. This is related to my earlier distinction between systemic and
immediate consequences of a decision.
(5) And thus (following from (4)) the balancing of costs and benefits by the
judge takes place at the margin, outside the core of settled doctrine-not
everything is up for grabs in every case. It would not do for the Supreme Court
to say, "While we recognize that freedom of speech has great social value, we
can't find any convincing evidence that the value added of having judges
enforce it justifies the costs entailed, since we observe that peer nations like the
United Kingdom have a reasonable amount of free speech without
constitutional limitations on Parliament's power to censor. Therefore we shall
no longer consider First Amendment claims justiciable." The pragmatic judge
is constrained by the settled features of the legal framework, whatever he thinks
of them.
The last two points-that pragmatism doesn't necessarily imply balancing
at retail and that any such case-by-case balancing is proper only outside the
settled core of doctrine-are particularly important to bear in mind in order to
prevent a too-quick collapse of pragmatism into case-by-case balancing. As I
said earlier, a pragmatist might reject the use of balancing tests in First
Amendment cases because he thought the consequences of using them were on
balance bad, maybe because they give judges too much discretion. I think on
the contrary that the balancing approach has considerable merit in First
Amendment cases outside the heartland of settled law, but this is not an
entailment of the pragmatic approach. It is unclear whether Rubenfeld

HeinOnline -- 54 Stan. L. Rev. 740 2001-2002

Apr. 2002]

PRA GMA TISM VERSUS PURPOSIVISM

appreciates this distinction; consequentialism, case-by-case balancing, and
cost-benefit analysis may be all one to him.
Pragmatic adjudication in free speech cases has meant, for example, that
judges who in the 1950s believed that the nation was endangered by
Communist advocacy of violent revolution did not think themselves compelled
by the vague language of the First Amendment-vague because, as I said
earlier, the critical term "freedom of speech" is not defined-to prevent
Congress from punishing that advocacy;"I the value of such advocacy seemed a
good deal smaller than the danger it posed. (We now think the value was zero.)
This example should engender skepticism about Rubenfeld's descriptive claim
that "at its historical core" free speech forbids censoring political dissent even
where "such dissent could genuinely lead to violence." 12 When the danger
posed by subversive speech passes, the judges become stricter in their scrutiny
of legislation punishing such speech. They know that such legislation may
curtail worthwhile public debate over political issues. Hence, when the country
feels very safe the Justices of the Supreme Court can without paying a large
political cost plume themselves on their fearless devotion to freedom of speech
and professors can deride the cowardice of the Dennis decision. But they are
likely to change their tune when next the country feels endangered. 13 The word
"feels" is important here. The country may have exaggerated the danger that
Communism posed. But the fear of Communism was a brute fact that judges
who wanted to preserve their power had to consider.
Similarly, if "respectable" society is united in being deeply offended by
pornography, the judges are unlikely to try to thwart the government's efforts
to suppress it, even if they privately scoff at Comstockery. Offensiveness is not
the only consequence that judges will or should consider in deciding how far
the First Amendment protects pornography, and it is not a constant. As people
become more blas6 about sexual expression, judges who value the arts and feel
incompetent to make qualitative distinctions, or are unwilling to allow
legislatures to place tighter restrictions on popular than on elite culture, will
curtail the regulation of pornography. They will allow complete prohibition
only of its very most offensive forms (today that is mainly child pornography),
and will allow only limited regulation of the less offensive ones-for example

11. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), aff'g 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950) (L.
Hand, J.). Hand's opinion for the court of appeals vividly evokes the Communist menace as
then perceived. With the wisdom of hindsight, it is apparent that nothing very terrible would
have happened had the Smith Act, the statute criminalizing conspiracy to advocate the
overthrow of the U.S. government by force or violence upheld in Dennis, been invalidated.
But that was not clear at the time.
12. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 792. Though he emphasizes prior restraints (that is,
censorship), his reference in this discussion to seditious libel and to nuisance laws indicates
that he anathematizes ex post punishment as well.
13. This sentence was written before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the
United States.

HeinOnline -- 54 Stan. L. Rev. 741 2001-2002

STANFORD LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 54:737

regulation in the form of zoning restrictions, 14 limitations on live performances
15
("nude dancing"), and restrictions on public display and access by children.
The ostensible justification for these restrictions, it is true, is the "secondary
effects" that establishments which offer erotic materials or entertainment are
thought to engender, such as prostitution and disorderly conduct, rather than
their offensiveness. But the ostensible justification cannot be taken seriously.
Politically unpopular speech has secondary effects too, namely a heightened
risk of public disorder; yet the Supreme Court has made clear that government
cannot, by banning unpopular speakers in order to prevent disorder, allow a
"heckler's veto." 16 To permit such a veto would encourage the hecklers and so
allow free speech to be drowned out. The proper response is to punish the
hecklers; and similarly one might suppose that the proper response to illegal
conduct stimulated by erotic displays would be to punish the illegal conduct.
Rubenfeld defends his own approach to free speech issues ("purposivism")
in part by criticizing balancing as unworkable. He puts the hypothetical case of
a speeder who seeks to justify speeding as a protest against a speed limit that he
thinks too low. Since, as Rubenfeld points out, 17 conduct can be expressive,
the pragmatist
would have to try to measure the value of driving at high speed as an

expressive activity, then balance this value against the pertinent harms, and
then ask whether the state could successfully address these harms while letting

some or all people drive a little faster on some or all highways at some or all
times.

18

But Rubenfeld has committed the fallacy of making simple decisions seem
difficult by decomposing them into their elements (as in Zeno's Paradox). One
can make a trip to the bathroom or tying one's shoelaces seem as difficult.
We'll see that reconstructing legislative purpose is likely to be more difficult
than comparing costs and benefits in the speeding case. That case is an easy
one for the pragmatist, who need only point out that to recognize a justification
14. Rubenfeld's statement that "with the arguable exception of commercial speech, all
protected speech, from pornography to political dissent, is treated formally alike in First
Amendment law," id. at 824, is incorrect. Pornographic bookstores can be zoned into special

"red light" districts. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49-52
(1986). Similar "content based" zoning of purveyors of political speech would be
unconstitutional.
15. Rubenfeld says that he would allow government to keep sexually explicit material
from children, Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 830, but he doesn't explain how this position
squares with his overall approach.
16. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35 (1992);
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949). I take it that Rubenfeld would
agree, since, while the concern behind the ban is not to restrict the expression of unpopular
views but merely to economize on police expense, the purpose is to restrict speech, with
economy being merely a desirable consequence, as well as the ultimate motive, of the ban.
The distinction is a fragile one, however, as I'll suggest later.
17. See also POSNER, supra note 3, at 88.
18. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 787.
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based on the speeder's alleged desire to protest the speed limit would
emasculate speed limits while doing only a very little to promote the expression
of useful ideas, since there are plenty of other ways of expressing disagreement
with a speed limit. The analytically similar case of conscientious objection to
military service is stronger for a freedom of conscience defense, not only
because we know that some people really do have strong feelings against
participating in a war (however just), but also because very few people actually
claim such exemptions; the stigma that attached to "draft dodgers" (whatever
their motives), when we had a draft, was a potent deterrent.
The academic tactic of studied obtuseness, of making the easy seem
difficult in order to score a point, is also on display when Rubenfeld remarks
"that no one can pretend to know whether the freedom of speech itselfis worth
its costs,"19 so that if we were serious about costs and benefits we would have
to be agnostic about whether there should be any right of free speech at all. An
absurdly overextended concept of freedom of speech might indeed not be worth
its costs, and even a much narrower concept might not be worth its costs in
particular conditions that fortunately do not obtain in the United States today.
But something like the existing concept, applied in the conditions prevailing in
the United States today, is clearly worth its modest costs. If pragmatism
endorses what may seem an unbecomingly timid judicial response to public
concern with offensive or dangerous speech, at the same time it justifies our
national commitment to freedom of speech by rejecting the Platonic view that
government can establish a pipeline to truth and having done so censor with a
good conscience. The pragmatist emphasizes the tentative, always revisable
character of our "true" beliefs. But philosophy is not needed to show that a
democratic political system, a scientific and technological culture, college and
university education, electronic media, a diverse religious culture, and a diverse
popular and elite artistic culture cannot prosper without freedom of inquiry and
expression. (The dependence of political democracy on freedom of the press is
particularly clear, as Tocqueville long ago remarked.)20 If one doesn't know
that much, one doesn't know enough to write an article about the First
Amendment. But of course Rubenfeld does know that much; he's just
pretending not to.
A better argument against balancing is that measures that have a really big
impact on speech are regularly ignored by the courts, which, however, pounce
on tiny ones. For example, the price of third-class mail, which is set by the
government, has a significant effect on the costs of magazines; entertainment
taxes have a profound effect on the film and theater markets; the telephone
excise tax affects the frequency of phone calls, some of which at least involve
the exchange of ideas and opinions; the deductions from income tax allowed to
19. Id. at 793.
20. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 172-74 (Harvey C. Mansfield

& Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2000) (1835).
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authors affect the number of books-so for that matter does the fact that
authors' royalties are subject to income tax. The examples could be multiplied
indefinitely. In contrast, most of the cases that have vindicated freedom of
speech in recent years have been faintly ridiculous, or at least distinctly
marginal, involving as they have pornographic art and entertainment, oldfashioned street demonstrations, scatological insults, commercial billboards,
and indecent Web sites. But this pattern is not a refutation of pragmatism or a
vindication of purposivism. The government has to tax, and to force it in the
name of the First Amendment to exempt all activities that involve the
production or dissemination of ideas and opinions would constitute an
enormous subsidy to those activities. It would be absurd, for example, to
exempt authors and TV anchors from federal income tax on the ground that the
exemption would lead to an increase in expressive activity (which it would).
The direct regulations of speech often have a smaller effect on the speech
market, but the bad consequences of prohibiting such regulations are
immensely smaller.
What is true, and is a shortcoming of the pragmatic approach, is that the
costs of freedom of expression are often more salient than the benefits, and
their salience may cause the balance to shift too far toward suppression. People
are often deeply offended by hearing their religious, moral, political, or even
aesthetic beliefs challenged; and offense is a cost. But it is also, as stressed by
John Stuart Mill in On Liberty, an unavoidable concomitant of social progress,
which depends on the continual overthrow of orthodoxy. This point is also
implicit in the pragmatic attitude toward truth as revisable and inquiry as
experimental, and in the pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce's specific point that
only doubt leads people to question their beliefs. Doubt is the engine of
progress, but because people hate being in a state of doubt they may prefer to
silence the doubters rather than to alter their beliefs. (So here is another direct
connection between pragmatist philosophy and free speech doctrine.) And
because the cost of heterodox speech is immediate and its benefit deferred, the
benefit may be slighted. All this must be kept steadily in mind by judges called
upon to uphold the suppression of expression in the name of protecting people
from being offended.
Yet judicial decisions invalidating regulation have the unfortunate
consequence (very disturbing to a pragmatist) of stifling experimentation and
so depriving society of experience with alternative methods of dealing with
perceived social problems. This is true even when the regulation is of speech,
and so the pragmatist is likely to be troubled by an approach to free speech like
Rubenfeld's that would banish from judicial consideration the likely
consequences of the judges' decisions, thus shutting their minds to arguments
that some novel regulation of expression might on balance have very good
effects provable only through experimentation. If the First Amendment told
judges not to consider effects, then a due respect for the pragmatic benefit of
judicial self-restraint would counsel the judges to swallow hard and ignore
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them. But nothing in the First Amendment in any intelligible sense commands
such abstention from reality, and the case law, far from treating free speech as
an "absolute," recognizes a host of permissible restrictions of it-I list a few
later. And while the risk ofjudges' overweighing the costs of free speech is a
real one, as I have indicated, because the costs tend to be immediate and the
benefits remote, I don't know on what basis this risk can be pronounced greater
than the risk of stifling beneficial government regulation; and when in doubt,
prudent judges asked to declare regulation unconstitutional will hold back to
avoid potentially debilitating clashes with the other branches of government.
I am not in total disagreement with Rubenfeld. The purpose, even the
motives, behind a regulation of expressive activity may indeed be relevant-to
assessing its consequences. We often and rationally infer the probable
consequences of an action from evidence of a desire by the actor to produce
them. People generally don't undertake a course of action without reason to
believe that it will accomplish their purpose in undertaking it. Mixed motives
are a serious problem in assessing legislative motive, as I'll note later, but there
may well be cases in which the motive for a particular restriction of expression
is sufficiently clear to influence the constitutional analysis. 2 1 And while I am
in a concessive mood, let me concede as well that there is a substantial basis for
pragmatic anxiety about doctrines that are so loose that they give judges carte
blanche to decide cases any which way they want without inviting criticism that
they are deviating from the previous course of decisions. This illustrates my
earlier point that pragmatism doesn't dictate a particular form of legal doctrine.
The pragmatist has nothing against rules; often they are a pragmatically
superior method of regulation to an "all relevant factors" standard. The case
for rules is strengthened in the area of free speech by the considerable risk that
censorship creates of empowering the censors to ban the expression of opinions
they happen not to like. But there is a difference between a presumption
against censoring or punishing speech and a blanket rule, such as that "in the
22
eyes of the Constitution, there is no such thing as a low-value opinion."
There are indeed valueless, noxious, and dangerous opinions, such as the
opinion of a madman, which he disseminates over the Internet, that it is the
duty of all true believers to kill prostitutes; and why should the law be
completely helpless against that opinion?
After more than two centuries of Supreme Court decisions, moreover, it is
difficult to argue with a straight face that categorical rules of constitutional law
occasionally laid down by the Court constrain judicial discretion (especially the
discretion of the Justices themselves, who cannot be prevented from overruling,
or distinguishing to death, precedents they don't want to follow) more than the

21. See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Cmn. L. REv. 413 (1996) (an earlier, more
tempered version of Rubenfeld's argument).
22. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 826.
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explicit balancing approaches that the Court sometimes follows, for example in
determining whether a search is reasonable, or in balancing the right to a fair
trial against the media's interest in reporting on trials, or-coming closer to the
subject at hand-in adjudicating time, place, and manner restrictions on speech
and expressive conduct.2 3 A common effect of substituting a rule for a
standard is that considerations that the standard required to be weighed become
sub rosa factors determining the scope of the rule and its defenses. Think of the
different layers of scrutiny that the Supreme Court requires courts to give
restrictions on freedom of expression in traditional public forums, designated
public forums, limited public forums, and nonpublic forums; would the results
be any different had the Court been content with a standard directing judicial
attention to the successively greater costs, as one proceeds down the forum
chain, of allowing unrestricted access to public property for expressive
24
activity?
Delusive exactness is a traditional pitfall in the design of legal doctrines,
and one that Rubenfeld's approach does not avoid, as when he argues that a
Florida city's ordinance forbidding begging should have been deemed
unconstitutional because it "target[ed] certain speech acts," namely requests for
handouts. 2 5 "Speech acts" cannot be targeted? Does this mean that threats
cannot be punished? How about offers to fix prices? To sell illegal drugs?
Promises to commit murder for hire? Harassing phone calls by importunate
creditors? Phone calls by heavy-breathing sexual harassers? Rubenfeld would
allow punishment of some conspiratorial speech, speech that is part and parcel
of forbidden conduct, 26 and this may take care of some of these examples, but
not the last two. Although he says that telephone harassment laws can be
upheld by analogy to laws forbidding breaking and entering, the analogy could
also be used to forbid begging when it is perceived, as it so often is, as
harassment. He contrasts soliciting handouts with soliciting votes, which he
thinks a paradigmatic case of privileged conduct. But it is not. Paying people
to vote is forbidden, as is soliciting votes at the entrance to polling places on
election day.
Rubenfeld wants to prohibit both too little and too much. Suppose that a
major city, concerned solely with traffic congestion, noise, and the crowding of
sidewalks and public parks, banned all activities from the streets, sidewalks,
and parks that involved accosting strangers or interfering with their freedom of
movement, including vending, picketing, begging, parading, demonstrating,
23. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984)
(employing balancing analysis in reviewing a time, place, and manner regulation).
24. See Chicago Acorn v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 150 F.3d 695, 703 (7th Cir.
1998) (Posner, C.J.) (discussing the "sliding-scale approach" suggested by Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee,
505 U.S. 672 (1992)); POSNER, supra note 3, at 71.
25. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 799.
26. Id. at 828.
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soliciting, and haranguing. Provided there was no purpose to suppress or
discourage the expression of opinions, such a ban would present no issue of
free speech for Rubenfeld. Or suppose that a law was passed forbidding false
statements of fact in presidential campaigns. The effect on political free speech
would be devastating, but the law, provided it really was intended just to
eliminate demonstrable falsehoods and not to stifle the expression of opinions,
would pass constitutional muster with Rubenfeld. He flinches at one point,
however, suggesting that a ceiling on all forms of campaign spending, not just
spending on advertising and other forms of communication, though aimed at
spending, not communicating, might well be unconstitutional because such a
high percentage of campaign spending is on communication rather than, for
example, security or transportation. 27 In fact, virtually all campaign
expenditures are directly or indirectly for communication.
And flinch he shoilld. Noting the analogy between a law that restricts
freedom of expression though aimed at something else and a law that restricts
religion though aimed at something else, he refers approvingly to Employment
Division v. Smith. 28 That case purports to hold that the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment is not infringed by a law of general applicability not
aimed at religion, even if the effect is to cripple religious observance. This
cannot be right. It would imply that a state that decided to forbid the sale or
consumption of alcoholic beverages could without violating the Free Exercise
Clause refuse to make an exception for the use of wine in Catholic services.
Whatever Smith, a parallel case involving the use of peyote by an Indian tribe
in a bona fide Indian religious service, may seem to imply, we can be
reasonably sure that the Supreme Court would invalidate a law that inflicted
29
equivalent damage on a major religion.
Rubenfeld's test also prohibits vastly more state action than can reasonably
be justified. It implies that child pornography cannot be banned from primetime television, although pornographers could presumably be forbidden to use
actual children in making the pornography. Military censorship in a major war,
if intended not only to prevent the spilling of military secrets but also to protect
morale against defeatist enemy propaganda, would be forbidden, and punishing
racist speech in prisons would be prohibited if intended not only to prevent
violence but also to encourage enlightened attitudes. Cabinet officers
presumably could not be fired for expressing opinions at variance with the
President's. Nazis could not be forbidden to send postcards to Jewish survivors
of Nazi concentration camps, expressing regret that the addressee had survived
and promising to do better next time. Yet a similar postcard, denying that the
27. Id. at 806.
28. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
29. I offer this prediction confidently even though the Court's opinion is explicit that
such a law would be constitutional, and though, as the opinion points out realistically, the
major religions have enough political muscle to obtain the necessary exemptions from
generally applicable laws. Id. at 890.
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Holocaust had occurred, could on the logic of Rubenfeld's approach be
forbidden as a demonstrably false statement of fact. Nazis believed that
Germans, Jews, and Slavs were all separate races in a biological sense; this was
false, and so the assertion of these beliefs could be punished. After striking all
errors of fact from Nazi propaganda, however, very little is left; the
fact/opinion dichotomy that Rubenfeld embraces 30 is devastating to continents
of speech and empties his contention that Nazi opinion is privileged 3 ' of any
practical meaning. 32 Political speech is suffused with falsehoods. To use law
to cleanse it of them would be a quixotic undertaking-or if it did succeed, it
could only be by stifling political speech. Politicians do not have the discipline
or the education to avoid making false factual assertions, especially but not
only when they are speaking extemporaneously.
I do not suggest that Rubenfeld would embrace all the implications of his
33
position that I have listed. But I think that as a matter of logic he should.
The most interesting and difficult of the illustrations that I have used to
exhibit the logic of Rubenfeld's approach are those involving the expression of
Nazi views. Since Nazi ideology poses no threat to American institutions or
decencies in existing circumstances and since it is difficult to demarcate Nazi
or "fascist" expression from other, more meritorious forms of reactionary or
Romantic thought, it ought to be allowed, crazy factual claims and all, without
which the Nazi would be quite speechless. But I would draw the line at
targeted abuse, my example of sending taunting postcards to Holocaust
survivors, where the quantum of offensiveness shoots up and a prohibition
would not significantly inhibit Nazi expressive activity. The intermediate case
is that of the Nazi march in Skokie, a largely Jewish suburb of Chicago that
contained a number of Holocaust survivors for whom the march revived bitter

30. See Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 819-21. The Supreme Court has rejected the
dichotomy for defamation cases, holding that a defamatory statement is not rendered
privileged by being expressed as an opinion. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1,
17-21 (1990). The Court pointed out that an expression of opinion often implies a factual
assertion. The point is not limited to the defamation context. If, as Rubenfeld's analysis
suggests, factual implications always rendered an opinion punishable, the First Amendment
would provide little protection for political speech.
31. "Nazi opinions cannot be banned." Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 826. But what
about the factual assumptions on which those opinions rest?
32. And the distinction between fact and opinion is a good deal less clear-cut than
Rubenfeld assumes. It is another example of the delusive precision of his approach.
33. Thus I don't understand his statement that his approach "is not intended to apply to
the special contexts of government-owned property (for example, military bases) where the
full set of ordinary First Amendment protections does not apply." Rubenfeld, supra note 1,
at 798. On his account, what is special about government-owned property, including
military bases? Likewise unexplained is his suggested distinction between "managerial" and
"regulatory" functions of government, the former illustrated by the courts, in which speech is
properly restricted, id. at 819, on pragmatic grounds, I would argue; but those grounds are
not available to Rubenfeld, who is engaged here in adding epicycles in an attempt to stave
off the collapse of his system.
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memories and may have seemed an ominous portent of what might someday
happen here. My court (before I joined it) held that the march was protected by
the First Amendment. 34 I have no serious quarrel with the decision. It was
easy enough for Jews to avoid the march (though not to avoid knowledge that it
was taking place)-easier than in my postcard hypothetical. And where was
the line to be drawn-could the Nazis march only in neighborhoods in which
the percentage of Jews in the population was below a specified level? How
would that level be determined?
I don't disagree with all the conclusions to which Rubenfeld's approach
leads him. I agree that Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale,35 which upheld the right
of the Boy Scouts to exclude homosexuals from membership on the ground that
allowing them to join would interfere with the Scouts' First Amendment right
to oppose homosexuality, was decided incorrectly. But our agreement is
accidental, my criticism of the decision being based on the simple point that
laws against discrimination would be ineffectual if discrimination that was
based on opinion-which much, maybe most, discrimination is based onwere constitutionally privileged. Rubenfeld's analysis of the case unacceptably
implies that an employer, while forced to hire blacks despite a sincere
ideologically grounded hostility to them, would be free to make the workplace
unbearable for them by subjecting them to his racist views. This is a form of
harassment that under current law is punished (unconstitutionally, according to
the logic of Rubenfeld's position) as being itself a form of racial
discrimination.
The pattern of prohibitions and permissions implied by Rubenfeld's theory
could not be made to sound sensible to a person who was not a lawyer. That's
a pretty dependable way of identifying a legal doctrine or proposal that is
unpragmatic. It lends a note of irony to Rubenfeld's description of his
approach as "purposivism." The only purposes he considers are those of
legislatures and other government agencies that want to restrict expressive
activity. He never quizzes his own purpose, and thus leaves unclear why he
wants to create the pattern of permissions and prohibitions that his approach
implies. The pattern makes no common sense, but maybe it makes some
special legal sense, something we pragmatists just are blind to. Rubenfeld
evidently thinks so, arguing that his theory is not imposed by him, as it appears
to be, but rather wells up from the cases he regards as paradigmatic. The
pattern is the law, or at least is in the law, constituting perhaps a central
tradition from which the Supreme Court has unaccountably strayed.
This is to equivocate between positive and normative analysis. In any
event, someone permitted to choose from the multitude of free speech decisions
three to be the fixed stars in the free speech firmament can have no difficulty
justifying whatever doctrinal structure he likes; the technique of picking your
34. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
35. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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best friends in a large, disorderly body of case law is facile. Someone who
wanted to argue for a more limited right of free speech could take as
paradigmatic not only Dennis but also the cases that hold that nonobscene nude
dancing, libel and slander, breach of a settlement agreement that required that
its terms be kept confidential, copyright infringement and plagiarism, threats,
free speech by prison inmates and soldiers, advertising by casinos, obscenity,
and foul language on prime-time television can all be punished without
violation of the First Amendment. But Rubenfeld's approach doesn't work
even on its own terms; it doesn't generate the outcomes he wants. His three
paradigmatic cases (not cases really, but rather judge-made doctrines) are the
absolute protection of political dissent, of religious speech, and of art. But
cases privileging expression cannot support the half of his theory which says
that the government has plenary authority to regulate expression when the
purpose is not to suppress opinions. Moreover, the First Amendment has not
been interpreted to protect political dissent, religious speech, and art absolutely.
Pornographic art is regulable, and likewise political or religious speech that
constitutes incitement, as when someone announces that it is his political or
religious duty to kill the President. Political and religious speech, along with
artistic expression, can also be limited in particular settings, such as prisons and
the military-along with a multitude of other nonpublic forums. And what
have political, religious, or artistic expression to do with begging, or for that
matter commercial advertising, both forms of expression that Rubenfeld
regards as protected by the First Amendment?
Although Rubenfeld states in his article that he will not try to ground free
speech doctrine in philosophy, he attributes his paradigmatic cases to a
questionable philosophical theory about the triumph of science in the domain of
fact. By a logic that he does not explain and is not transparent, the fact that
science has accustomed us to draw a sharp distinction between verifiable fact
and unverifiable political, religious, moral, and aesthetic opinion has, he
believes, led judges to give greater constitutional protection to the latter domain
of thought and expression than they did before its hopelessly unscientific
character was recognized. There is an echo of logical positivism, which divides
experience into tautologies (such as "no bachelors are married"), which are true
by definition; verifiable facts, the truth value of which can be determined
empirically; and everything else. Tautologies are the province of logic,
dictionaries, and mathematics, verifiable facts the province of science, and
everything else the province of emotion. Political, religious, moral, and
aesthetic statements are emotive; they have no truth value at all. 36 The
implication for First Amendment doctrine, the implication that Holmes, who
anticipated elements of logical positivism, drew, is that censorship makes no

36. The classic statements remain A.J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC (rev. ed.
1946), and, before him, DAvID HOME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING §

12, pt. 3, at 209-10 (Tom L. Beauchamp ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1999).
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sense. As Plato in defending censorship clearly understood, censorship
presupposes the ability of the censor to distinguish true from false political,
religious, moral, and aesthetic opinions.
Neither Rubenfeld nor I wish to paddle in deep philosophical waters.
Logical positivism in the strong form implied by his analysis is rejected by
most philosophers today;37 but that is neither here nor there. Holmes can be
understood to have been making a simple pragmatic point: Censorship works
best if there are objective criteria that the censor can use, as with the Food and
Drug Administration's censorship of claims for the safety or efficacy of drugs,
or the Securities and Exchange Commission's censorship (albeit post hoc,
unlike the FDA's review of new-drug applications) of prospectuses for new
issues of securities. But it doesn't matter, as Rubenfeld seems to believe,
whether the criteria are "objective" because they are scientific in the sense of
observer-independent, or objective merely in the sense of resting on a
consensus of the relevant community. No scientific method is available to
prove that child pornography, or movies of people engaging in sexual
intercourse with animals, are "wrong." But everyone in this society whose
opinion counts believes these things are wrong and should be prohibited, and
that is all that is necessary to create an "objective" basis for prohibiting them,
notwithstanding the First Amendment. Rubenfeld wants to banish these beliefs
from First Amendment law, but he will not be able to do that until he (or
someone) weans people from them. That is a task to which constitutional
theory lends no assistance.
So the grounds of his approach, both philosophical and juridical, are shaky;
and the pattern of outcomes that the approach generates is unappetizing and
unmotivated. There is another thing seriously wrong with his argument: He
underestimates the difficulty of discerning legislative motive. 38 That difficulty
would be even greater if his proposal were adopted, because legislators would
then "game" it by peppering the legislative history with assurances that their
motives were pure and their purpose innocent of reference to opinion.39 But
37. Those rejecting logical positivism include pragmatists; indeed, within philosophy
pragmatism is considered to have knocked science off the perch on which logical positivism
had placed it. Rorty, supra note 8, at 637. This is an intramural battle; the outsider to
philosophy is more likely to be struck by the affinities between logical positivism and
pragmatism, especially in their shared skepticism about moral absolutes and other products
of the kind of rationalism that one associates with Plato and Kant and, in law, with naturallaw theories.
38. The objection cannot be elided, as Kagan, supra note 21, at 439, believes, by
shifting the focus to the question whether, but for the impermissible motive, the legislation
would have been enacted. My example in the text that follows illustrates the potential
indeterminacy of the answer to that question.
39. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CI. L. REv.
149, 149 (2001) (proposing "a positive cycling model in which legislators and judges
develop self-defeating expectations about the behavior of other actors in the lawmaking
system, thereby causing a cyclical pattern of continuous mutual adjustment that never
reaches a stable equilibrium").
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the difficulty is great enough without regard to that possibility.
Rubenfeld argues that so long as bullfighting is banned out of concern for
the welfare of the bulls rather than the "message" conveyed by bullfighting (of
macho values, perhaps), the fact that it has a message which the ban therefore
blocks is unproblematic under his approach. But in the real world, a ban on
bullfighting would be supported by some legislators who wanted to kill the
message, 4 0 by others who wanted to save the bulls, by others who had both
objectives, and by others who had no view of the matter but were simply log
rolling with the anti-bullfight legislators. The ban would have no single
purpose. It is unclear what outcome "purposivism" yields in such a case.
There is still worse. For we must consider why this is a purpose case rather
than a motive case. Remember that for Rubenfeld if the purpose of a regulation
is to restrict expressive activity, the regulation is not saved by the fact that the
motive is to accomplish some innocent end, such as saving money on police, or
saving the lives of bulls. The bullfighting case as posed by Rubenfeld seems to
be a purpose case rather than a motive case because the ban on bullfighting can
be stated without any reference to expressive activity: "Don't kill bulls." But
this can't be right, because there is no law against killing a bull (provided you
own it). The ban is on killing bulls for a particular purpose, namely their use in
an expressive activity that depends upon the killing. This seems like purposive
discrimination against a disfavored expressive activity, Unless I am mistaken,
Rubenfeldian purposivism implies that prohibiting bullfighting in the United
States is unconstitutional.

40. This point was made by Judge Easterbrook, discussing dhe same hypothetical, in
his dissenting opinion in Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1127 (7th Cir.
1990), rev'd,Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
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